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ABSTRACT 
 The imminence requirement for preemption can make all the moral difference in 
deciding to launch a lethal strike. Influenced by Michael Walzer’s just war criteria for 
preemption, I provide three necessary conditions to strike first in self-defense. A 
commander must justifiably believe three things: that an unjust aggressor is poised to 
attack, that her capacity to avert an attack is constrained by an imminent decision point or 
last window of opportunity, and that preemption is part of a moral-risk proportionate 
strategy. In any event, a commander must decide to preempt or not preempt under 
conditions of uncertainty. As such, I incorporate and supplement Seth Lazar’s 
rights-based expected utility approach to lethal action. 
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What is the role of imminence in preemptive self-defense? From a task force 
perspective, self-defense strikes are not uncommon.1 From a national perspective, true 
preemption is comparatively rare.2 Yet, whether from a task force or a national perspective, 
how a commander conceptualizes imminence becomes critical to moral action.3 A classic 
example of a preemptive strike occurred on June 5, 1967. Egypt posed an imminent threat 
against Israel and, in response to that threat, the state of Israel conducted its first wave of 
military attacks against enemy forces. Less well known, on March 7, 2016, a large 
formation of al-Shabaab fighters posed an “imminent threat” against U.S. forces and their 
African Union partners in Somalia.4 As a result, a U.S. task force conducted a “self-
defense” strike against this formation and killed over 150 people.5 Across the globe, 
preemptive strike decision-makers command troops in both national and tactical arenas.  
To begin this discourse, imminence must be seen as a necessary requirement for 
preemption, which is the term normative theorists use when an unjust aggressor poses an 
imminent threat of attack, and a defender strikes first in self-defense.6 Insofar as a defender 
foresees an imminent threat and need not await her fate before taking action, preemption 
                                                 
1 The term “strike” can apply to all levels of war. The levels of war are typically divided into strategic, 
operational, and tactical. A popular comparison is that tactics win battles; operations win campaigns; and 
strategies win wars. The term strike as I use it means lethal and instrumental in purpose. Strikes can 
promote just, justified, or unjust ends.  
2 For an empirical study of interstate wars since 1816, see Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg 
Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen.” International Security; vol. 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 5–34. 
3 By “commander,” I mean a person with the legitimate authority to make a preemptive strike 
decision. 
4 “U.S. Strikes Al Shabaab Training Camp in Somalia, More than 150 Killed,” Reuters, March 8, 
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia-dronestrike/u-s-strikes-al-shabaab-training-camp-in-
somalia-more-than-150-killed-idUSKCN0W91XW. This strike occurred in a non-combat zone; an area not 
designated or declared as a theater of armed conflict. 
5 The strike was conducted under a “Self-Defense and Collective Self-Defense” authority granted to 
them by President Barack Obama. “U.S. Strikes Al Shabaab Training Camp in Somalia, More than 150 
Killed.” 
6 Henry Shue and David Rodin, Introduction, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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can be just.7 If preemption is just—if pre-strike conditions underwrite the other 
requirements of just war action (liability, necessity, and proportionality)—then a defender 
would not morally wrong an aggressor by striking first.8  
Regrettably, outside of normative theory, when the conditions did not warrant a 
preemptive strike, past invocations of the term preemption have compromised our 
nomenclature. Since at least the time of the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq, preemption has suffered 
from a conceptual hangover. Due to wanton abuse by national leaders who eschewed a 
false narrative to justify war, preemption roiled in a dive bar of fear, conceptual conflation, 
and a consort of connotation. As a caricature of this narrative as a whole, which I draw to 
show how preemption can belie a derailment of ideas, imagine a U.S. political actor 
speaking in earnest: 
When we say preemption, we mean prevention, and by prevention, what we 
really mean is a war that is aggressive, unnecessary, and unjust.9 We accept 
this awful truth because the permanent threat of terrorism represents a 
vicious enemy, with a “murderous ideology,” who may soon acquire or who 
may soon unleash, as in the past, weapons of mass destruction.10 Think of 
September 11th, 2001; the train bombing in Madrid, 2004; the killings in 
Nice, Bastille Day 2016; and the suicide attack in Manchester, 2017.11 Such 
threats, no matter how unlikely, represent an unacceptable risk and must be 
                                                 
7 Whether one can morally judge a “war as a whole” is doubtful; the idea that wars are “morally 
heterogenous” is compelling: Saba Bazargan, “Morally Heterogeneous Wars,” Philosophia 41, no. 4 
(2013): 959–975. For a justified act of preemption, however, I still choose to refer to the just side as 
defenders and the unjust side as aggressors in reference, if you like, to their jus ad bellum moral distinction. 
8 Since an aggressor has no right against a just attack, a defender’s just strike would not constitute a 
moral wrong.  
9 By “unnecessary,” I mean it fails to meet the necessity requirement of either jus ad bellum or jus in 
bello.  
10 For more on how “Preventive war short-circuits nonmilitary means of solving problems” see Neta 
C. Crawford. “The Slippery Slope to Preventive War.” Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 30–
36. The “murderous ideology” reference is from George W. Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the State of the Union,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 38, no. 5 (January 29, 
2002): 133–39, quoted in Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International 
Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 27.  




destroyed without delay.12 We are in a global state of emergency; ours is a 
war against evil.13  
Citizens of the United States are not the only ones to have faced a collective need 
to disembark from such a dangerous train of thought. Israelis too had to overcome false 
narratives after the Second World War. For example, with the European catastrophe 
(HaShoa) in mind, Hanna Arendt confronted the Jewish mood in 1948 with respect to 
Arab-Israeli relations in Palestine. The Jewish mood then was similarly grave to what still 
exists today in the hearts of many Americans. Arendt’s moral admonishment to her fellow 
Jews took the following form:  
Now Jews from Palestine all seem to believe that “only a military decision 
can settle the issue” between us and the Arabs. Beneath this belief is an 
“ominous” presumption, that “Arabs, all Arabs, are our enemies.” However, 
such an attitude is morally wrong. Mass belief in the need to fight an ill-
defined enemy “at any cost” is “an expression of fanaticism and hysteria.”14  
A commander who preempts an attack in self-defense need not subscribe to an 
extreme or amoral position. The underlying premise of this thesis is that we must return 
preemption to its rightful place—onto the moral side of war. To do so, however, requires 
that we reframe our notion of imminence. If the concept of imminence is too broad, an 
individual or a nation may conduct a preventive strike under a false banner of 
                                                 
12 According to the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, “We must adapt the concept of imminent 
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries” (p. 15). However, on that same page is an 
example of the conflation between preemption and prevention: “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by 
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” White House, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: September 2002), 15. https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/63562.pdf. Vice President Dick Cheney believed that the U.S. must treat even a 1% 
chance that Pakistan was helping al-Qaeda build a weapon of mass destruction “as a certainty” in terms of its 
response. Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, “Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure 
Than Washington Thinks,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (April 2012): 79–93; Ron Suskind, One Percent 
Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).  
13 For a study on evil as a rhetorical tool post-9/11, see Robert L Ivie. “Evil Enemy versus Agonistic 
Other: Rhetorical Constructions of Terrorism.” The Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies 25, 
no. 3 (2003).  
14 Hannah Arendt. “To Save the Jewish Homeland: There Is Still Time.” Commentary; New York 6 
(January 1, 1948): 400–406. 
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preemption.15 If the concept of imminence is too narrow, a moral audience may wrongly 
blame a preemptive defender for committing an act of aggression. Henceforth, I define 
preemption as self-defense in the face of imminence—an action that is necessary to avert 
an unjust and credible threat.  
I claim that imminence determines a decision point, which means a commander’s 
decision to preempt cannot be postponed. Rather than characterize the temporal aspect of 
imminence in reference to when a strike will land or when an attack will hit its target, a 
commander must regard imminence in reference to a crucial decision: Either to strike first 
in self-defense or prepare to cope with an unjust attack.  
Imminence requires two conditions. A commander must justifiably believe that:  
1. An unjust aggressor is poised to attack, which I cover under the Credible 
Threat Condition. 
2. Her capacity to avert an attack is constrained by an imminent decision 
point, which I cover under the Temporal Necessity Condition.  
In the face of imminence, a commander is triggered to make a decision.16 However, 
to justifiably take action, to strike first, a third condition must also be met:  
3. The commander must justifiably believe that preemption is part of a 
moral-risk proportionate strategy, which I cover under the Proportionate 
Strategy Condition.  
Implicitly, a good-faith commander shall not attack if any of these three conditions 
are false (i.e., she is not disingenuous in her role as a defender). I provide these three 
necessary conditions—Credible Threat, Temporal Necessity, and Proportionate 
Strategy—as a set of analytic tools that commanders may wield in case they are ever faced 
with a preemptive strike decision. 
  
                                                 
15 Although all preemption is, in a non-operative sense, preventive, if an act is merely preventive (not 
in response to an imminent threat), then it is not preemption. “Preventive self-defense” is equivalent to 
“aggressive self-defense,” which is a contradiction in terms, see Susan Uniacke, “On Getting One’s 
Retaliation in First” in Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, ed. David Rodin and Henry 
Shue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
16 To the extent possible, when I use the term imminent, I refer merely to temporal necessity. By 
imminence or imminent threat, I refer to the combination of temporal necessity and a credible threat.  
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II. A WEAK CONCEPT OF IMMINENCE 
The imminent unknown is not to be avoided, but embraced. 
—Tom Maxwell17 
 
To help motivate this venture into conceptual analysis, I illustrate how a weak 
concept of imminence can give rise to a practical and combat-related concern. Then, within 
the context of preemption, I focus on the theoretical groundwork required to strengthen our 
understanding of imminence.  
Commanders lack clear, legal guidance for preemptive action. In general, 
ambiguity can translate into operational flexibility; however, in the balance between clarity 
and ambiguity, current guidance on imminence falls apart, which I shall demonstrate. Two 
main sources of official guidance on lethal action include the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Since LOAC and ROEs diverge in terms of 
their respective criterion for preemptive force, service members from other nations depend 
upon drastically different legal authorities to launch a preemptive strike.18 Article 51 of 
the UN Charter affirms “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”19 
Pursuant to that article, and in accordance with Customary International Law (CIL), the 
use of force in self-defense is justified “in anticipation of an imminent armed attack.”20 
However, with respect to ROEs, some soldiers are constrained by imminence, while others 
are constrained by the concept of hostile intent to justify individual, unit, or collective self-
defense. For example, U.S. forces are authorized and, in some cases, even obligated, to use 
“necessary and proportional force in self-defense in response to hostile acts or 
                                                 
17 Tom Maxwell, “Alan Watts and the Eternal Present,” Longreads (blog), February 8, 2018, 
https://longreads.com/2018/02/08/alan-watts-and-the-eternal-present/. 
18 Official authorization is different from an order or a mandate, but without it, service members are 
not permitted to apply discretion in the use of force. 
19 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 47.  
20 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, 47 (note 229). Furthermore, the right of self-defense 
against non-state actors is reflected in UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 from 2001. 




demonstrated hostile intent.”21 On the other hand, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany require “imminence” which “is understood to be a temporally bound concept that 
means ‘immediate.’”22 Thus, a weak concept of imminence can translate into a real-world, 
practical concern for modern warfighters and defenders. Consider the following example.  
Imagine a coalition soldier in Afghanistan observes an Afghan man “digging a 
hole” adjacent to a road.23 The location of that hole is along a common path of ISAF 
(International Security Assistance Force) convoys, but there is no convoy currently 
approaching. Imagine also that this coalition soldier is limited due to her distance and sight-
angle in discerning the exact purpose of the Afghan. She believes, however, that he is 
setting up an IED (improvised explosive device). Despite the possibility that digging a hole 
in certain contexts may satisfy hostile intent, this threat is not immediate and, for some 
countries, an immediate threat is what is meant by imminent. Thus, in a matter of self-
defense, country of origin could determine if that soldier’s discretion may apply or if she 
is forbidden from using force. In this scenario, a U.S. soldier could fire at her discretion 
whereas a service member from the United Kingdom, France, or Germany could not. At a 
critical juncture, when self-defense is at stake, such a disparity can undermine 
interoperability in a coalition environment.  
To highlight just how broad the concept of imminence can be, consider current U.S. 
guidance. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has published standing ROEs, which 
list the following definitions: 
Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United 
States, U.S. forces, or other designated persons or property. It also includes 
the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. 
forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital U.S. government 
property. 
                                                 
21“Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in 
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.” Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, 233, 
note 257.  
22 E. L. Gaston, “Reconceptualizing Individual or Unit Self-Defense as a Combatant Privilege,” 
Harvard National Security Journal 8 (2017): 299. 
23 A similar hypothetical is in Gaston, 287. 
7 
Imminent Use of Force. The determination of whether the use of force 
against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts 
and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and may be made at any 
level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or 
instantaneous.24  
These two definitions provide very broad guidance, which, as stated, opens up the 
possibility that a commander may conduct a preventive strike under a false banner of 
preemption. Further, U.S. ROEs make clear only what imminence does not mean. What 
imminence does mean or should mean is not covered. If the circumstances that satisfy 
imminence depend upon everything, “an assessment of all facts and circumstances,” then 
those circumstances might as well depend upon nothing. To understand what would cause 
the facts and circumstances to constitute imminence in one case but not in another is to ask, 
what do we mean by imminence? 
In 1842, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster provided an early characterization 
of imminence, which we know as the Caroline doctrine.25 Still in legal use today, the 
requirement for imminence is a circumstance “where the necessity of self-defense [is] 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”26 
While the Caroline doctrine has been scrutinized for generations in both academia and 
jurisprudence, it is important to focus on the timeless purpose of a legal right of self-
defense—“to afford States a self-help mechanism by which they may repel attackers.”27 
24 U.S. Army, Operational Law Handbook, 17th ed. (Washington, DC, 2017), 79 (emphasis added).
25 Thomas M. Nichols, Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008): 2. 
26 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary
(Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2 Int’l L. Dig. 412, § 217 (John Bassett Moore, ed., 1906), quoted in E. L. 
Gaston, “Reconceptualizing Individual or Unit Self-Defense as a Combatant Privilege,” Harvard National 
Security Journal 8 (2017): 283–332. 
27 Michael N. Schmitt, “Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law,” The Marshall
Center Papers, No. 5 (Nov. 2002), 23. http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/
F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_5-en.pdf.  
8 
With this purpose in mind, imminence cannot lack operational utility.28 Of all the elements 
in Webster’s criterion, “no moment for deliberation” seems the least useful and is entirely 
too strict as an action-guiding principle.29 Given that a decision to take a preemptive action 
is a moral decision, one cannot expect a commander to make the right decision if there is 
no time for deliberation. Time to deliberate is essential for this kind of moral action, and 
so Webster’s characterization of imminence can be seen as too narrow. 
Michael Walzer concurs that the Caroline doctrine is too narrow and cannot 
accommodate preemption. In his critique, Walzer views the Caroline account as akin to “a 
reflex action, a throwing up of one’s arms at the very last minute.”30 He writes, “Even the 
most presumptuous aggressor is not likely to insist, as a matter of right, that his victims 
stand still until he lands the first blow.”31 A commander requires not only time to deliberate 
but also adequate time to maneuver. A reflex action may dampen an aggressor’s blow, but 
that action is inadequate to avert an unjust harm.  
Beginning with Webster’s account, the Caroline doctrine, I see three plausible 
options to best understand imminence and preemption: 1) Imminence should apply to 
28 To address the “paucity” of jus ad bellum guidance for “self-defense against an imminent or actual
armed attack by non-state actors,” Daniel Bethlehem published 16 relevant principles, which he offers “for 
debate without any accompanying explanatory memorandum or commentary” (p. 774). He notes that his 
principles neither reflect the law or the practice of any State (p. 775). Although my approach is completely 
different, it is in the same spirit: to help inform operational thinking about these issues. Daniel Bethlehem, 
“Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors,” The American Journal 
of International Law; Washington 106, no. 4 (October 2012): 770–77. In principle 8, “whether an armed 
attack may be regarded as imminent,” Bethlehem lists the following: “(a) the nature and immediacy of the 
threat, (b) the probability of an attack, (c) whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of 
continuing armed activity, (d) the likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result 
therefrom in the absence of mitigating action, and (e) the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to 
undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, 
or damage. The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of 
an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of a 
right of self-defense, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed 
attack is imminent” (775–76). 
29 Only in fiction can a commander order, “Shields Up” and thus save his ship and crew in the span of
a moment (e.g., Star Trek, The Motion Picture, from 2009). 
30 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th Edition




something other than when an attack will land; 2) A new account of preemption is needed; 
3) Both options one and two, which would reframe our notion of imminence.32  
In this thesis, I will take on option three: namely, I argue that imminence should 
not apply to the timing of when an attack will land but to when a commander must make a 
decision. Additionally, a new account of preemption is needed, for which I argue.  
To help build my support for this new account, I use Walzer’s criteria for 
preemption as a point of departure. Although Walzer does not describe it in these terms, he 
himself picks option two in his approach to Webster: namely, Walzer does not attempt to 
alter Webster’s notion of imminence, but he does broaden the criteria for preemption in 
comparison to Webster’s legal precedent.33 In Walzer’s view, three “sufficient threat” 
factors justify a preemptive strike (which should not be confused with the three necessary 
conditions for which I argue): 1) A manifest intent to injure; 2) A degree of active 
preparation that makes that intent a positive danger; 3) A general situation in which 
waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.34  
To illustrate each item in his list, Walzer covers the three weeks leading up to the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt had announced its political goal to destroy Israel in the case 
of war, begun a massive troop buildup in the Sinai, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping, and formed a military alliance with Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.35 These events 
expressed the “manifest intent” and “positive danger” features necessary to satisfy 
sufficient threat factors one and two. To exemplify factor three, Israel was physically 
vulnerable to the increased risk of harm from an unjust attack. After Egypt’s troop buildup 
                                                 
32 A fourth approach is to claim that since imminence is so restrictive, instead of preemption, there 
may be cases of justifiable prevention. Both Randall Dipert and Michael Doyle proceed on this route. 
Randall R. Dipert, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” Journal 
of Military Ethics 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 32–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570500465728. Doyle, 
Striking First. Of Doyle’s four standards for prevention (p. 43)—lethality, likelihood, legitimacy, and 
legality—the one that I do not address is legality: has the aggressor violated international law and has the 
defender sought authorization from the UN Security Council? Even though I wholeheartedly agree with 
this legal standard, I focus mainly on morality. 
33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81. 
34 Walzer, 81. 
35 Walzer, 82–84. 
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in the Sinai, Israel had responded by fully mobilizing its reserve units to take up defensive 
positions along its border.36 As part of the “magnified risk” of not fighting, a “basic 
asymmetry in the structure of forces” was in place.37 While Egypt could have kept its army 
on Israel’s border “indefinitely,” an outcome Egypt might have considered as a win, Israel 
could not sustain full reserve-unit activation.38 This put a “time limit” on Israel’s ability to 
avert an unjust attack. According to Walzer, an “intense fear spread in the country,” which 
he later describes as “a just fear.” This “just fear” existed because it was based both on 
intent and a real danger. Due to these factors, Israel’s preemptive strike was, in Walzer’s 
view, morally legitimate.39  
Prior to looking at his three sufficient threat factors, I wish to bracket Walzer’s 
extraneous addendum of fear as it may detract from a substantive justification for 
preemption. The relationship between fear and war cannot be resolved here. Millennia ago, 
Thucydides attributed fear to what we now call aggressive wars—wars fought for “fear, 
honor, and interest.”40 While fear may accompany an apprehension of imminence, it is 
unclear how fear alone can add justificatory weight to an act of preemption.41 On one hand, 
                                                 
36 Walzer, 82–84. 
37 Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (New York, Harper & Row, 1975), 212, 
quoted in Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 84. 
38 Walzer, 84. 
39 Walzer, 83–85. In contrast to the general treatment of the Six-Day War as a justified or textbook 
case of preemption, the moral legitimacy of Israel’s decision to strike first is still open to debate: John 
Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tom Ruys, “Armed Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 272–280. 
40 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War, 
Robert B. Strassler ed. (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 43, quoted in Colin S. Gray, The Implications of 
Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). For other fear-based accounts of preventive war, see James D. Fearon, 
“Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414; and Shiping 
Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” International Studies Review 10, no. 3 (September 1, 
2008): 451–71. In contrast, fear-based accounts of preemption can also be found. For example, the “fear of 
immediate attack” is cited as a motivating reason for preemption in Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder 
Keg Myth,” 7. Also, the so-called preemptive occupation of the Philippines and Hawaii was attributed to 
fear by George H. Quester in “Two Hundred Years of Preemption,” Naval War College Review; 
Washington 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 23.  
41 Walzer probably holds the view that fear alone cannot add justificatory weight, given his “just” 
qualifier, but Susan Uniacke is ultra-clear on this point in “On Getting One’s Retaliation in First,” 77–9. 
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fear is an emotion. Fear tends to create stress, impair judgment, and exaggerate risk.42 On 
the other hand, psychologist Richard Lazarus holds that cognition and emotion are 
intricately tied: how an individual cognitively appraises a situation gives rise to a 
subsequent emotion; how events or behaviors are perceived either positively or negatively 
is part of a cognitive appraisal and re-appraisal process, which can both generate and 
attenuate emotion.43 Thus, it may be possible to generate a rational fear. However, since 
fear alone is susceptible to highly subjective factors, I hold that fear is unnecessary and 
insufficient to justify preemption.  
Fear aside, I analyze Walzer’s three sufficient threat factors for preemption in the 
following form. Walzer’s first two factors constitute a Credible Threat Condition. Due to 
its complexity, I divide my analysis of Walzer’s third factor between two different sections. 
To wit, its indistinct temporal feature can be replaced by a Temporal Necessity Condition. 
Additionally, its consideration of risk, while incomplete, can be included as part of a 
broader Proportionate Strategy Condition. For clarity, the Credible Threat and Temporal 
Necessity Conditions are necessary to assign imminence to a situation. The Proportionate 
Strategy Condition is necessary to strike first in preemptive self-defense.  
These three conditions—Credible Threat, Temporal Necessity, and Proportionate 
Strategy—reframe and better express the role of imminence in preemption. Furthermore, 
they are designed to help commanders abide by the moral demands inherent to preemptive 
self-defense.44 The first condition necessary to assign imminence to a situation is the 
Credible Threat Condition.  
  
                                                 
42 David Ropeik, How Risky Is It, Really? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 188–197. 
43 Richard S. Lazarus, “Thoughts on the Relations between Emotion and Cognition.,” American 
Psychologist 37, no. 9 (1982): 1019–1024. Similarly, Aristotle believed that emotions “share in some way” 
with reason as a child may listen to and obey his parents. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by 
Christopher Rowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 102b26-32, quoted in Nancy Sherman, Stoic 
Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind The Military Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 72  
44 Moral preparation for war is critical to mitigate the risk of moral injury—in this case, an action or 
omission that evokes a sense of haunting regret. See Robert E. Meagher and Douglas A. Pryer, eds., War 
and Moral Injury: A Reader (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018). As Jonathan Shay prescribes, ethics 
training is essential to “force protection in the mind and spirit” (p. 301). 
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III. CREDIBLE THREAT CONDITION 
Credible Threat Condition: A commander must justifiably believe that an 
unjust aggressor is poised to attack.45 This belief is subject to the following: 
the aggressor has both the resolve and the capability to attack and therefore 
represents a credible threat; the aggressor is morally liable to defensive 
harm.46 
A. RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY 
Walzer’s first two factors—manifest intent, and a positive danger—operate in 
parallel to a common understanding of resolve and capability. Enemy resolve and enemy 
capability are two critical areas of focus within the intelligence community.47 If an entity 
has the “irreconcilable will” to attack, then this resolve is morally equivalent to manifest 
intent.48 If an entity has the means and readiness to pose a serious quantum of harm, then 
this capability is morally equivalent to a positive danger. In any event, I assume that 
commanders have an intelligence directorate at their disposal or within their organizations. 
Intelligence analysts collect from various sources of information to judge, although not in 
name, whether Walzer’s first two sufficient threat factors—enemy resolve and enemy 
                                                 
45 To act in self-defense, a defender must judge and anticipate that the enemy is “literally poised to 
attack.” Rodin, War and Self-Defense, 144. 
46 In this section, one topic that I do not discuss, but hold firm, is that the burden of proof for a 
justifiable belief in the Credible Threat Condition falls upon a prospective defender: namely, a commander. 
Specifically, a commander cannot presume that an aggressor is liable to defensive harm—a lack of 
evidence for non-liability does not count as evidence for liability. While burden of proof is pertinent to 
small-unit self-defense, counter-terrorist operations, and even national defense, this is too large of a topic to 
adequately cover here. One might find it obvious that defenders should justify their belief that an entity is 
poised to attack, but group-think dynamics can be pernicious. For instance, labels such as terrorist or 
“rogue state” become problematic when there is a presumed perpetual state of imminence. Even in a global 
war on terror, which can never be won, it is wrong to assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that all 
members of a non-state terrorist organization constitute a perpetual threat. Based on various cases of unjust 
police targeting against black males, research into the domestic problem of implicit bias has shown that 
stereotyping in police practices can occur behind the scope of conscious awareness. See Katherine B. 
Spencer, Amanda K. Charbonneau, and Jack Glaser, “Implicit Bias and Policing,” Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass 10, no. 1 (2016): 50–63. However, in war, if hostile intent is attributed to an entire 
group by an appropriate authority due to an ongoing threat of attack, then follow-on military actions would 
fall outside of the scope of preemption. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, JP-2-0, (Department of Defense, 2013), 71. 
48 C. C. Krulak and A. M. Gray, Warfighting, MDCP-1 (Department of Defense, 1997), 3. 
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capability—are met.49 Through this directorate, commanders track their adversaries’ 
activities, signals, and warnings to assess whether an aggressor constitutes a credible threat.  
To support their belief in a credible threat, commanders must understand enemy 
resolve, which presumes personal or organizational familiarity with the enemy. A 
commander may gain or borrow upon this familiarity only after long hours of observation, 
collection, or interaction. As an example, reconnaissance is a functional responsibility of 
command—to learn enemy patterns of life and to discover enemy tactics as they evolve. 
Through this understanding, commanders are expected to recognize indications of resolve 
as actions unfold.  
In addition to resolve, a commander’s appreciation of enemy capability is no less 
dynamic. A narrow definition of capability is in terms of means, composition, disposition, 
and strength to attack.50 By comparison, a broad definition of capability would add “design 
acumen” as a conceptual element.51 A commander’s appreciation of enemy capability 
could also include the cyber realm—the ability of an enemy to conduct a Stuxnet-like 
                                                 
49 Information collection is divided into unique disciplines: geospatial intelligence, human 
intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, 
technical intelligence, and counterintelligence. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, 115. To process this 
data, an analyst must understand the “operational environment,” which is the “composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 
commander. It encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information 
environment (which includes cyberspace); the [electromagnetic spectrum]; and other factors.” Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3–0 (Department of Defense, 2017), 102. As a warning, such idealized 
doctrinal descriptions may over-sell what is within the realm of possibility.  
50 The SALUTE report, which U.S. commanders learn in basic training, captures this notion well. 
SALUTE stands for size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.  
51 Warfare as a “design competition” entails an “alignment of doctrine, information, technology, and 
organizational structure,” which are the keys to achieve a strategic advantage. See John Arquilla and Nancy 
Roberts, Design of Warfare, Monograph (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2017). For example, 
during World War II, part of the evil genius of the German blitzkrieg was the German alignment of tanks, 
aircraft, and mobile radios to their organizational structures, doctrine, and “information flows” in a design 
meant to bring those new technologies to bear. At the time, this new capability enabled the Germans to 
cripple and overwhelm a much larger and better equipped French force beginning in 1939 and a similarly 
‘superior’ Russian force through 1941 (pp. 18–20).  
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attack, as in 2009 against the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran.52 Depending on 
its scope, there can be great breadth to the concept of military capability itself.  
Primarily, a commander should appreciate the unique relationship between resolve 
and capability: the absence of either implies that a threat lacks credibility. Resolve without 
capability is like the black knight in the farcical comedy, Monty Python and the Holy 
Grail.53 While guarding a small bridge that crosses a waterless gully, a knight bellows, 
“None shall pass.” King Arthur claims, “But I must cross this bridge.” The knight responds, 
“Then you shall die.” A less than epic sword fight ensues, wherein King Arthur triumphs 
and the knight suffers the loss of both his arms and legs. Relentlessly, the knight goads the 
king: “I’ll bite your legs off!” King Arthur continues on his way, and thus ends the scene. 
The black knight has an irreconcilable will to attack and his last line is ‘threatening.’ 
Nonetheless, since he is incapable of inflicting any physical harm to the king, he lacks 
credibility. In contrast, capability without resolve is like a heavily armed Fred Rogers from 
Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood.54 If Mister Rogers starts a massive arms buildup, say he 
develops or acquires some new weapons technology, then he would have the capability to 
attack. Rogers would have the means and, due to his proximity, he would be in a powerful 
state of readiness to attack his neighbors with virtually no warning. However, since Mister 
Rogers is a friendly neighbor, since he presumably will not manifest aggressive intent, his 
threat is also non-credible.  
                                                 
52 T. M. Chen, “Stuxnet, the Real Start of Cyber Warfare?,” IEEE Network 24, no. 6 (November 
2010): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.1109/MNET.2010.5634434; Irving Lachow, “The Stuxnet Enigma: 
Implications for the Future of Cybersecurity,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs; Washington, 
Fall 2011, 118–26. It is unclear whether a nation can preempt a cyber-attack. Attribution aside, once a 
program designed to inflict physical damage to critical infrastructure is released, the attack is past—to avert 
the subsequent harm requires network defense, which is different from preemption. Punishment or actions 
taken to deter future cyber-aggression is also a separate matter from preemption. The Chatham House 
interpretation of what is necessary for preemption or anticipatory self-defense is an imminent threat of 
“armed attack,” not “mere economic damage” as perhaps sanctions or a computer virus might inflict. 
Chatham House, “The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-
Defence,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 4 (2006): 965. See also, Michael N. 
Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017); John Arquilla, “Twenty Years of Cyberwar,” Journal of Military 
Ethics 12, no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 80–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.782632.  
53 Monty Python and the Holy Grail, directed by Terry Gilliam and Terry Jones (1975; UK: Michael 
White Productions, 1975) DVD. 
54 Fred Rogers (March 20, 1928 – February 27, 2003) was the iconic “friendly neighbor” from the 
popular PBS kids program, see https://www.fredrogers.org/media/mister-rogers-neighborhood/.  
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Resolve and capability are not only required for a credible threat; they may be 
interdependent. Although asked in a different context, this notion is captured well in 
Madeleine Albright’s famous question, “What’s the point of having this superb military 
you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”55 With respect to covert or clandestine 
operations capability, perhaps there is truth to the idea that certain enemy capacities can 
lower the threshold of an enemy’s willingness to attack.56 The following is a common 
complaint against the capacity to employ remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs): Since RPA 
operations present such a light footprint in terms of physical risk to friendly forces, they do 
not press hard upon that belligerent state’s public conscience; therefore, RPA operations 
can increase a state’s propensity to use force.57 Despite such complaints, how capability 
affects enemy resolve shall depend upon the enemy.  
However, even if certain capabilities could lower the threshold for resolve, can a 
high level of resolve lower the threshold for capability? I think not. Regardless of resolve, 
if a commander justifiably believes that an entity cannot attack, but may be able to in some 
distant future, then he cannot attest to the existence of either a credible threat or, by 
extension, an imminent threat. This is true even if a resolute enemy is in the process of 
developing or acquiring some new weapons technology. However, when does an emerging 
threat transition into a credible threat? Such a question cannot elicit a general answer, but 
we can imagine an entity who, in terms of resolve, is similar to Monty Python’s black 
knight. This knight is working to attain, but currently lacks, the means to attack. Even so, 
King Arthur would not be justified in using lethal force against an ill-wisher that can do no 
harm. Or, consider the situation in Syria in 2007 when that country was in the process of 
                                                 
55“What’s the Point of Having This Superb Military If You Can’t Use It?,” The Economist, March 11, 
2011, https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2011/03/11/whats-the-point-of-having-this-
superb-military-if-you-cant-use-it.  
56 This concern is not new because the ability to conduct special operations or covert paramilitary 
operations has always existed. For more on interdependence, see Lucia Retter et al., The Moral Component 
of Cross-Domain Conflict (RAND Corporation, 2016).  
57 For a comprehensive account of RPA operations that addresses these concerns in detail, see Bradley 
Jay Strawser, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 342–68. 
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developing weapons-grade plutonium.58 Aware of Syria’s covert program, U.S. officials 
had deliberated on whether to conduct an attack against Syria’s nuclear reactor in al-Kibar, 
which Syria had modeled after and built with some assistance from North Korea.59 At the 
time, Michael Hayden, Director of the CIA, briefed President George W. Bush that the al-
Kibar reactor was part of a “nuclear weapons program.”60 Yet, since the CIA “could not 
identify other essentials (a reprocessing plant, work on a warhead, etc.)” they had “low 
confidence” in Syria’s nuclear weapons capability.61 Without capability, a preemptive 
strike was off the table.62 Thus, a future threat is not necessarily a credible threat. To be 
imminent, a threat must be credible, which means confidence in an aggressor’s capability 
must be greater than, or far greater than, low. 
B. NEAR CERTAINTY AS A JUSTIFIABLE BELIEF 
Of course, it is possible for a person to have confidence in an unjustified belief or 
no confidence in a justified belief. However, in the context of national or small-unit self-
defense, ‘confidence’ is an institutionalized expression of the strength of a myriad of 
reasons in support of a belief, and its underlying logic. A commander’s relevant beliefs, 
partly based on intelligence estimates, could be either that a credible threat is present, that 
a threat is imminent, or that a first strike is the best course of action. But in contrast to the 
stochastic language that is often used, intelligence estimates are generally not the result of 
                                                 
58 Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the 
Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today; Washington 38, no. 6 (August 2008): 15–21. See also the 
video and data released by the Nuclear Threat Initiative in 2011: http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/461/.  
59 David Makovsky, “The Silent Strike,” The New Yorker, September 17, 2012, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/17/the-silent-strike.  
60 Michael V. Hayden, “Correcting the Record about That Syrian Nuclear Reactor,” Washington Post, 
September 22, 2011, sec. Opinions, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/correcting-the-record-
about-that-syrian-nuclear-reactor/2011/09/22/gIQA1xZtoK_story.html. 
61 Hayden.  
62 On September 6, 2007, after it was clear that the U.S. would not conduct an attack, an eight-ship 
formation of Israeli fighter aircraft dropped “seventeen tons of explosives” on the al-Kibar reactor, but I 
would argue that theirs was an act of prevention, not preemption. Makovsky, “The Silent Strike.” Aaron 
Kalman, “Israel Used 17 Tons of Explosives to Destroy Syrian Reactor in 2007, Magazine Says,” The 
Times of Israel, September 10, 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-uses-17-tons-of-explosives-to-
destroy-syrian-reactor/. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Declassified: How an Israeli Operation Derailed Syria’s 




statistical analysis. Correlations to percentages based on terms like “near certainty” are 
merely approximations.63 Since an approximation is subject to different analytic 
frameworks and experience, dependent on the analytic team, the evidence is open to 
interpretation.  
As former CIA director Hayden has pointed out, “When the facts speak for 
themselves, intelligence has done its job and there is no need for analysis.”64 Intelligence 
does not exactly convey facts or truth. Rather, intelligence is better viewed as a “proximate 
reality.”65 To give a sense of how close to reality an intelligence estimate might be, analysts 
sometimes attribute a level of confidence to their assessment. Confidence merely 
communicates how well the “scope and quality” of collected information aligns with good 
intelligence tradecraft.66 For example, in the Department of Defense, “high confidence” 
implies that a judgment is based on “well-corroborated information from proven sources; 
minimal assumptions; strong logical inferences and methods; and that no gaps or only 
minor intelligence gaps exist.”67 Analysts express the strength of their confidence in an 
estimate in a matter of degrees (low, medium, or high). 
In the executive branch, similar estimative language is in U.S. guidance for the use 
of force abroad.68 When targeting suspected terrorists outside “areas of active 
hostilities”—areas such as Somalia in 2016 for example—the United States must have 
                                                 
63 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and 
Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington, 
DC: Director of National Intelligence, 2017), 13. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
64 Jack Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts” Studies in Intelligence 60, no. 3 
(September 2016), 14–24, 15.  
65 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th Edition (Los Angeles: CQ press, 
2017), 38. 
66 Lowenthal, 272.  
67 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, 114. Careful examination of dissenting opinions has been 
emphasized in post-2003 Intelligence Community reforms.  
68 White House, Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of 




“near certainty” that the “imminent threat” is present.69 The United States must also have 
“near certainty” that “non-combatants will not be injured or killed.”70 Analysts express the 
likelihood of a future event using terms such as remote, likely, and nearly certain.  
With this institutionalized epistemic criterion in mind, I view an attribution of near 
certainty as a placeholder, or worthy substitute, for a justifiable belief. Within the 
description of each necessary condition for preemption—Credible Threat, Temporal 
Necessity, and Proportionate Strategy—a commander could substitute ‘justifiably 
believes’ with the phrase: has near certainty. Although just war theorists might prefer the 
former description, a commander of a nation or of a task force might prefer the certainty 
lexicon. It matters not. What does matter is that a commander’s approach to preemptive 
self-defense is grounded in the immutable bedrock of just war literature: necessity, liability, 
and proportionality. 
C. JUST WAR REQUIREMENTS  
Two sides exist to each of the following just war requirements: necessity, liability, 
and proportionality. Individually, each requirement constrains all military action in war, 
but collectively, they can motivate a commander to take action. Commanders who 
recognize that their response to a situation satisfies all three just war requirements 
collectively, thereby discover a morally preferred action. If a situation is such that 
preemption is a morally preferred action, then a commander has a positive, impersonal, 
and moral reason to strike first in self-defense.  
The beauty of the necessity requirement lies in the fact that it interconnects with 
nearly all aspects of just war literature. For a just war, by definition, necessity requires that 
                                                 
69 White House, 24–26. Designated conflict zones include Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, parts of Libya, 
and recently (post the al-Shabaab strike mentioned earlier), parts of Somalia. Regarding which terrorists to 
target abroad, the 2001 Authorized Use of Military Force applies only to “al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, or 
associated forces.” White House, 3–8. Public release of post-2016 U.S. presidential guidance for the use of 
force abroad is pending. In October of 2017, news reports indicated that President Donald Trump replaced 
President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) with a document titled “Principles, 
Standards, and Procedures” (PSP). Peripheral details regarding this document—including the downgrade 
from near certainty to reasonable certainty (p. 5)—may be found in the ACLU’s legal complaint against the 
Departments of Defense, Justice, and State. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
1._aclu_complaint_against_dod_doj_dos_12.21.17.pdf.  
70White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks,” 24–26.  
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an entity resort to war only if necessary and pursuant to a just cause.71 To fight justly in 
war, necessity requires that an entity only select military objectives that are necessary to 
achieve a just war aim. However, in a case of preemption, the military objective is itself a 
just war aim—to avert an unjust harm (e.g., national or small-unit self-defense). Notably, 
in cases of preemptive self-defense, the necessity requirement consists of three elements:  
1. (Who) Only defend against those that are necessary, that is, only attack
targets that are liable to be harmed.
2. (When) Only use defensive force when necessary, that is, only attack
when temporally constrained by an imminent decision point.
3. (How) Only use the amount or intensity of force necessary, that is, only
use proportionate force.72
One can draw a parallel between these three elements and the three necessary 
conditions I listed earlier for preemption: respectively, (1) Credible Threat, (2) Temporal 
Necessity, and (3) Proportionate Strike. As mentioned, the first two of these conditions—
Credible Threat and Temporal Necessity—are themselves necessary, in a conceptual sense, 
to assign imminence to a situation. Similarly, David Rodin recognizes that imminence is 
“the application of the necessity requirement subject to epistemic limitations.”73 Since no 
one can have complete certainty that an entity will attack—a topic relevant to moral risk, 
which I later cover—it is in this sense that we are epistemically limited. For an illustration 
of how this maelstrom of ideas relate to one another, see Figure 1. 
71 Jus ad bellum necessity assumes that all reasonable peaceful alternatives, likely to avert an attack,
have been exhausted. Chatham House, “The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of 
Force in Self-Defence,” 967.  
72 In addition to necessity, proportionality also depends on liability. Specifically, the extent of harm an
aggressor is “liable to bear” depends on the “stringency” of the rights that the aggressor threatens to 
unjustly violate. Jonathan Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2015): 144–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12056. 
73 Rodin references George Fletcher who writes, “A preemptive strike against a feared aggressor is
illegal force used too soon; and retaliation against a successful aggressor is illegal force used too late. 
Legitimate self-defense must be neither too soon or too late.” Fletcher, G., Basic Concepts of Criminal 




Figure 1.  Necessary Requirements for Preemption74 
D. LIABILITY TO DEFENSIVE HARM 
From a right-based point of view, if an aggressor poses an unjust credible threat, 
and is morally responsible for that threat, then he is liable to defensive harm. Traditionally, 
the question of who or what is a legitimate target of war is covered under the rubric of 
discrimination. According to International Humanitarian Law, legitimate targets include 
combatants or people directly engaged in hostilities, military vehicles, weapon systems, 
command centers, and other military objectives.75 Illegitimate targets include non-
                                                 
74 This three-dimensional figure has a few features. The x-, y-, and z-axes are scaled in a matter of 
degrees: 0 is complete ignorance, and 1 is complete certainty. 0 ≤ x, y, z < 1. Imminence is a function of the 
x and y variables. Preemption is a function of all three variables. In the two non-shaded areas, as a 
commander’s collective degree of certainty increases toward 1: the moral risk of preemption decreases 
toward 0; conversely, the moral risk of inaction increases toward 1—this is difficult to discern due to the 
figure’s three-dimensional character. At some point along the z-axis— the degree of certainty that a 
commander may attribute to her justifiable beliefs per the Proportionate Strategy Condition—the moral risk 
of inaction outweighs the moral risk of preemption.  
75 For reference, see Additional Protocol II, Geneva Conventions, and “Chapter 1: Distinction 
between Civilian and Combatants” and “Chapter 2: Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military 
Objectives.” In the International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 




combatants or people not engaged in hostilities, farms, towns, hospitals, places of worship, 
schools, and other civilian objects.76 Rather than discuss the legitimacy of a target in terms 
of discrimination, which relies on labels such as combatant and non-combatant, I shall 
speak to the legitimacy of a target in terms of liability, which is based on human rights. In 
Walzer’s view, enemy combatants pose a lethal threat and thereby “force men and women 
to risk their lives for the sake of their rights.”77 Given that humans are social creatures and 
have human rights, when an entity violates his duty not to unjustly harm others, he becomes 
liable to defensive harm.78 An aggressor is liable to be harmed by a defender because the 
latter must protect herself. In contrast, a defender, opposing an aggressor, is not liable to 
be harmed because a defender’s threat is just. Hence, the moral asymmetry between a just 
and an unjust strike is inextricably grounded in liability.  
An aggressor’s degree of liability depends on his degree of moral responsibility.79 
Contrary to Walzer, Jeff McMahan rejects merely “posing a threat” as a criterion for 
killing.80 In his view, “moral responsibility for an unjust threat” generates liability to 
harm.81 Moral responsibility presumes moral agency, which implies that a moral actor can 
                                                 
76 International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Database.  
77 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 51. 
78 The extent of her liability depends also on the necessity (including temporal necessity) and 
proportionality of defensive harm. For a discussion on Wesley Hohfeld’s Classification of Rights and 
Duties, including the author’s discussion on common areas of confusion, see Arthur Corbin, “Rights and 
Duties,” 33 Yale Law Journal, 501 (1924).  
79 This is despite the fact that lethal harm is indivisible. 
80 Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 
(2005): 386–405. And Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
McMahan also rejects the moral equality of combatants (MEC) doctrine (pp. 38–95), but that is not critical 
to imminence.  
81 Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in Just and Unjust Warriors: The 
Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 21. See also McMahan, Killing in War, 157. For a critique of the responsibility requirement to 
liability, Seth Lazar, “The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 38, no. 2 (2010): 180–213; In defense of the responsibility requirement, Bradley Jay 
Strawser, “Walking the Tightrope of Just War,” Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 533–44; Jeff McMahan, “Who Is 
Morally Liable to Be Killed in War,” Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 544–59. For a liability-based account not 
grounded in responsibility, but on collective complicity, Saba Bazargan, “Complicitous Liability in War,” 
Philosophical Studies 165, no. 1 (2013): 177–195. For an evidence-based view of liability to harm, Bradley 
Strawser, The Bounds of Defense: Killing, Moral Responsibility, and War (forthcoming). For background 
analysis on moral culpability as a “triggering condition” for the right of self-defense, Jeff McMahan, “Self-
Defense and Culpability,” Law and Philosophy 24, no. 6 (2005): 751–74.  
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act in an otherwise justified, or less unjustified, way. A volunteer soldier, for example, who 
can elect not to fight for an unjust cause is, to some degree, morally responsible for the 
threat she poses.82 Conversely, an innocent man who is thrown down a shaft and thereby 
poses an involuntary threat, due to his mass and the force of gravity, against a person 
standing one-thousand feet below would not be morally responsible for an unjust threat.83 
Since liability hinges on moral responsibility, a volunteer soldier is liable but the falling 
man would not be liable to be killed.84 Moreover, even if the person standing below the 
falling man had a “ray gun” and could disintegrate the man in mid-air, to do so would be 
unjustifiable on the grounds of liability.85  
As presented, from the perspective of a commander, whether of a nation or of a 
small unit, a rights-based approach to preemption starts with the question of liability. Thus, 
far, I have largely talked around the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum distinction.86 Perhaps 
one cannot speak to the justice of killing in war without speaking to the justice of the war 
itself, but commanders who conduct military operations outside of a combat zone are 
implicitly held to both sets of moral and legal codes. Besides, it makes little moral 
difference whether a commander considers liability in terms of discrimination or in terms 
of a just cause. Discrimination is ultimately a question of who is liable to defensive harm.87 
Similarly, a just cause—given the inherent right of self-defense—can be rephrased into an 
albeit awkward question of who is liable to a defensive war. By no means is this required 
                                                 
82 While McMahan grants that liability can rest on the “bad luck of serving a government that is 
plotting aggression,” his view is that moral responsibility rests first or is ultimately based on both 
individual “choice and action.” Jeff McMahan, “Commentary,” in Doyle, Striking First, 142–143.  
83 His falling body is what poses the lethal threat. David Rodin, “Justifying Harm,” Ethics 122, no. 1 
(2011): 74–110, https://doi.org/10.1086/662295. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: 
Oxford-Blackwell, 1974), 34–35.  
84 This aligns with McMahan’s views on “Nonresponsible Threats,” McMahan, Killing in War,167-
173.  
85 Rodin, “Justifying Harm,” 84. 
86 Reductionist approaches, which base liability on individual moral responsibility, use liability to 
answer both jus in bellum and jus ad bellum questions such as “who can be killed in war” or “when is 
entering a war justified.” Jovana Davidovic, “Should the Changing Character of War Affect Our Theories 
of War?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice; Dordrecht 19, no. 3 (June 2016): 604.  
87 McMahan, Killing in War.  
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for my argument, but since both of these questions turn on liability, perhaps they may each 
share in their respective “division of moral labor.”88  
Forging ahead, I explore the Temporal Necessity Condition, which is the second 
necessary condition to assign imminence to a situation. 
  
                                                 
88 Adil Haque who holds that even though the law governing jus in bello cannot prohibit killing in 
pursuit of an unjust cause, “this prohibition resides” in the law governing jus ad bellum. In his view, these 
two bodies of the law share “a division of moral labor.” Adil Haque, Law and Morality at War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 3. See also Yitzhak Benbaji, “The War Convention and the Moral Division 
of Labour,” The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 237 (October 1, 2009): 593–617. 
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IV. TEMPORAL NECESSITY CONDITION 
A. TWO NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IMMINENCE 
Walzer’s third sufficient threat factor for preemption provides no clear measure to 
judge whether a situation is temporally necessary to avert aggression. He does, however, 
provide an indistinct temporal feature: “A general situation in which waiting, or doing 
anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”89 In terms of timing, I interpret 
Walzer’s third factor as a situation where unless a commander preempts now or at least 
soon, instead of waiting, his prospects will continue to degrade. Further, a commander must 
fight before it is too late. Based on these temporal considerations, Walzer does create an 
important sense of moral urgency. However, his standard lacks a framework to recognize 
the circumstances under which preemption is temporally necessary. Hence, I argue for the 
Temporal Necessity Condition.  
Temporal Necessity Condition: A commander must justifiably believe 
that his or her capacity to avert an attack is constrained by an imminent 
decision point: her last window of opportunity is closing.90 This window to 
preempt may be closing due to enemy action, anticipated action, or 
operational constraints.91 Regardless, the commander’s decision to preempt 
or not preempt cannot be postponed.92  
Given that Temporal Necessity is the second necessary condition to assign 
imminence to a situation, how can a commander use both the Temporal Necessity and 
                                                 
89 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81. 
90 By “last window of opportunity,” I do not imply that self-defense is opportunistic in the same sense 
that belligerents sometimes strike targets of opportunity. My view is closer to that of Michael Schmitt who 
writes, “Imminency [sic] is not measured by the objective time differential between the act of self-defense 
and the attack it is meant to prevent, but instead by the extent to which the self-defense occurred during the 
last window of opportunity.” One difference between his and my view is that I focus specifically on the 
window of time that a commander must make a decision whereas Schmitt’s window is to complete an 
action. Schmitt, “Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law,” 65. 
91 Bureaucratic constraints should not fall under the rubric of operational constraints. However, 
bureaucratic obstacles may hinder the perception of a last window of opportunity; this is different problem. 
For a detailed study on some of the organizational obstacles, “structural blocks to perception” (p. 176), that 
can lead to a surprise attack, see Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988). 
92 Although a decision is necessary, the full necessity of preemption also depends on the 
Proportionate Strategy Condition.  
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Credible Threat Conditions as a litmus test for whether he truly faces an imminent threat?93 
To illustrate, I offer two examples with hypothetical details to show how the Credible 
Threat and the Temporal Necessity Conditions each play an essential role in a commander’s 
assignment of imminence. One example is a negative case of imminence and the other is a 
positive case of imminence:  
Negative Case of Imminence: The time of this example is 1983. Imagine a 
Soviet commander’s satellite-based, early-warning system indicates that the 
U.S. has launched five nuclear missiles towards her nation.94 If she waits 
until the missiles are close enough to corroborate her data with ground-
based radar, she will not have enough time to complete her own launch 
sequence before those five missiles reach their targets. Worse still, if the 
enemy destroys her command center, she will be unable to attack in self-
defense to avert a follow-on attack.95 This Soviet commander has no time 
to delay, her capacity to avert an unjust attack is constrained by an imminent 
decision point. However, based on the Soviet commander’s understanding 
of U.S. tactics, she views five missiles as too few to be credible.96 She 
believes that true enemy aggression would entail a massive attack of at least 
fifty missiles, ten times more than the number indicated on her screen. The 
commander also believes that no early-warning system is perfect. She 
reasons that since the enemy would never launch a surprise attack with so 
few of missiles, her system’s indications must be false. The commander 
assesses her situation: Since her capacity to avert an attack is constrained 
by an imminent decision point, she satisfies the Temporal Necessity 
Condition; however, since she distrusts the evidence that would otherwise 
support her belief that the U.S. is poised to attack, she does not satisfy the 
Credible Threat Condition. As such, this commander may not assign 
imminence to his situation. 
Positive Case of Imminence: The time of this example is just prior to the 
2016 U.S. strike in Somalia, discussed earlier. The U.S. task force 
                                                 
93 By “imminent,” I mean temporally necessary, and by “threat,” I mean a credible threat. Combined, 
imminent plus threat is equivalent to my notion of imminence. Likewise, by “imminence,” I mean a 
situation where a commander satisfies both the Temporal Necessity and the Credible Threat Conditions. 
94 This hypothetical is loosely based on the Soviet-American “War Scare” on September 26, 1983, 
when Soviet Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislav Petrov’s detectors picked up a five-missile ICBM launch from 
the U.S. Len Scott, “Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited,” Intelligence and 
National Security 26, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 770. 
95 Hypothetically, perhaps her nation lacks a command mechanism to defend against further 
aggression after a successful decapitation strike.  
96 This point actually matches closely with the actual 1983 case: Despite the warnings, since Petrov 
“had been trained to expect a massive ICBM assault rather than a handful of missiles,” he decided not to 
verify that “an attack was in progress.” Scott, “Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War,” 770.  
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commander believes a formation of al-Shabaab fighters is poised to attack, 
not immediately, but in the following way.97 The fighters are currently 
massed together, yet he anticipates that they will soon splinter into small 
teams to achieve great tactical surprise in a coordinated and unjust attack. 
In his view, this is his last window of opportunity because once the 
formation splits, he will no longer have the capacity to protect his coalition 
or partner forces. The commander assesses his situation: Since his unjust 
enemy is poised to attack, he satisfies the Credible Threat Condition; since 
his capacity to avert an attack is constrained by an imminent decision point, 
he satisfies the Temporal Necessity Condition. As such, this commander 
may assign imminence to his situation.  
B. IMMINENCE AS A LAST WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
Temporal necessity implies that a commander cannot withhold or reserve 
judgment. Such commanders lack the luxury of time and are faced with an unjust moral 
deadline—derived from the unjust threat of an aggressor. By extension, such commanders 
cannot wait for more evidence.98 To see how temporal necessity translates into a moral 
deadline, consider the following two cases: 
Ship Sink 1: Suppose that a merchant crew—one captain, and five 
crewmembers—embark on an Arctic journey.99 Just after leaving port, they 
discover that their ship is leaking and rapidly sinking. If they do not return 
to port in the next five minutes, all six members will drown. Given that the 
captain in charge refuses to change course, the only way to save the crew is 
                                                 
97 This is not to speculate on what the real-world commander actually believed or to answer any moral 
subtext-related questions regarding U.S. operations in Somalia in general. These hypothetical details are 
meant only to provide realistic reasons for a justifiable preemptive strike.  
98 The inability to wait for more evidence can affect the problem of epistemic uncertainty, which is an 
inexorable problem of the human condition. In any situation, a commander must deliberate future action 
within a sphere of knowledge that exists somewhere between complete ignorance and complete certainty. 
Although I cover this topic in greater detail in the next section, temporal necessity does add a unique 
perplexity. Suppose a commander lacks overwhelming evidence to decisively point one way or another in 
terms of the other two conditions—Credible Threat or Proportionate Strategy. On one hand, it seems that 
the existence of a moral deadline could only further challenge his epistemic standing—not only does he 
lack decisive evidence, but now he has no time to increase his evidentiary support. On the other hand, since 
a commander is not morally responsible for his moral deadline, given that temporal necessity is derived 
from the unjust threat of an aggressor, perhaps his epistemic burden would decrease. This may create a 
whole new line of inquiry, but either way, commanders lack the ability to expand their sphere of achievable 
knowledge. 
99 This thought experiment is loosely based on an example given by Paul Robinson, Criminal Law 
Defences, Vol 2, (Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1984), 56–57, referenced in Onder Bakircioglu, “The 
Right to Self-Defence in National and International Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement,” 
Indiana International & Comparative Law Review. 19 (2009): 20.  
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to kill the captain (i.e., his disposition on the bridge precludes any non-lethal 
alternative).  
Ship Sink 2: Suppose the same crew is on the same journey, but with the 
following exception. Long after leaving port, the crew discovers that their 
ship is leaking and slowly sinking. If they do not begin their 48-hour return 
journey in the next hour, all six members will drown. As before, the only 
way to save the crew is to kill the captain.  
The situation in Ship Sink 1 matches the traditional temporal understanding of 
imminence—the infliction of an unjust harm is imminent. If the crew does not kill the 
captain in the next five minutes, everyone on board will die. In this case, both the threat 
and the crew’s decision to kill the captain are imminent. As such, on the grounds of 
temporal necessity, the crew can justifiably kill the captain in self-defense.  
The situation in Ship Sink 2, however, does not match the traditional temporal 
understanding of imminence—the infliction of harm is not imminent because the crew still 
has a couple of days before the ship will sink. Should this preclude the crew from justifiably 
acting in self-defense? I think not. Although the infliction of an unjust harm is not 
imminent, the extremity of their situation seems morally equivalent to Ship Sink 1. In Ship 
Sink 2, the crew has comparatively more time to deliberate (an hour versus five minutes) 
and significantly more time before they will suffer from the infliction of an unjust harm (a 
couple of days as opposed to five minutes). However, those temporal elements seem to 
make little moral difference. What matters more is that the crew’s last window of 
opportunity to avert an unjust harm is closing in an hour.100 That sounds imminent; once 
that window closes, there is no opportunity for recourse. Even though the harm is not 
imminent, the deadline for their decision is imminent. This distinction is the basis for my 
claim that we must modify our notion of imminence. If an imminent decision is the 
temporal component of imminence, and I claim that it is, then the crew in Ship Sink 2 could 
justifiably kill the captain in self-defense.  
                                                 
100 According to the Chatham House, the concept of imminence entails “a circumstance of 
irreversible emergency” Chatham House, “The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use 
of Force in Self-Defence,” 967. 
 
 29 
Ultimately, commanders must bear in mind that the temporal aspect of imminence 
is not relative to when an unjust attack will land or when a victim will suffer from the 
infliction of an unjust harm. Rather, they must hold that imminence is temporally linked to 
a crucial decision: Given that an unjust aggressor is poised to attack, a commander must 
decide whether to strike first in self-defense or prepare to cope with an unjust attack. In 
both Ship Sink 1 and 2, the moral deadline for the crew’s decision to strike first, as opposed 
to drowning in an Arctic sea, is imminent. Thus, to kill the captain is temporally necessary 
to avert an unjust threat.  
Imminence is necessary for preemption; however, it is not sufficient. A third 
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V. PROPORTIONATE STRATEGY CONDITION 
A. PROPORTIONALITY AND MORAL RISK 
A first strike may not necessarily be the best course of action. Even in the face of 
imminence, the moral costs of a nuclear first strike, for example, are so prohibitive that it 
is difficult to imagine a circumstance wherein such an option can ever be considered 
morally conscionable.101 In addition to imminence, a commander must also consider the 
balance of moral risks, which entails a proportionality assessment of expected moral costs. 
In general, to satisfy the proportionality requirement, the stakes of war must be sufficient 
(the positive effects must outweigh the negative), and the costs of war cannot be prohibitive 
(the negative effects cannot outweigh the positive).102 Specific to preemption, the moral 
costs of striking first cannot be disproportionate to the moral stringency of the harms 
averted.103 Based solely on the grounds that a commander can justifiably assign 
imminence to her situation, it does not follow that she can justify preemption.  
If the moral risk of preemption is disproportionate to the moral risk of inaction, then 
preemption would not be morally conscionable. Walzer’s third sufficient factor for 
preemption only points to the risk of inaction: “A general situation in which waiting, or 
doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”104 In terms of risk, I 
interpret Walzer’s third factor as a scenario where inaction (or non-preemption) will result 
in a very-high-level rise in risk. While the risk of inaction is an important consideration, it 
                                                 
101 Because, even in the face of imminence, a commander cannot be completely certain that an enemy 
will actually attack. This is not to say that nuclear capability is not relevant to preemption. As a deterrent, 
nuclear capabilities can effectively lower enemy resolve. Furthermore, ballistic missile defense systems can 
lower an aggressor’s capacity to launch a successful attack (at least until new counter-counter-measures are 
developed). As Kevin Payne writes, “Active defenses may extend decision-making time and reduce the 
impact of not preempting early, helping to keep a lid on conflicts.” Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the 
Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 145.  
102 Both perspectives suffer from the same problem of developing good metrics for which to measure 
positive versus negative effects. Bradley Strawser and Russell Muirhead. “Assessment, Proportionality, and 
Justice in War.” In Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure, ed. Leo Blanken, et 
al. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 255–65. 
103 As Jonathan Quong writes, “The more stringent the right that is threatened, the greater the degree 
of defensive harm that is proportionate.” Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” 145. 
104 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81. 
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is not the only relevant measure of risk necessary to justify preemption. A commander must 
also consider the comparative moral risk of preemption itself.  
 
Risk = Probability × Severity105 
 
Risk analysis is based on a function of probability and severity. Based on this 
function, given the product relationship between the two elements that make up risk, if the 
severity of an event rises, even if the probability of that event remains constant, then the 
level of risk still increases. This is important because a commander cannot base her 
decision to preempt on the risk of inaction alone; otherwise, a mere rise in risk can lead to 
disaster. Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962: The Soviet Union deploys 
nuclear weapons to Cuba.106 In this action, the severity of a possible Soviet attack against 
the United States increases for two reasons: The missiles in Cuba add to the number of 
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles the Soviet Union has in its arsenal; plus, the missiles in 
Cuba, given Cuba’s proximate location to the United States, decrease U.S. warning time in 
the event of a Soviet attack. With respect to probability, imagine that the likelihood of a 
Soviet attack remains constant. Despite their deployment of weapons to Cuba, suppose the 
Soviet Union does not change in its resolve to attack (i.e., the Soviets are unwilling to strike 
first). Nonetheless, there is still the potential for disaster. Based on the risk function, since 
the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba increases the severity of an attack, even when 
the likelihood of such an attack is constant, the United States still faces a rise, perhaps a 
greatly magnified rise, in risk (i.e., Walzer’s third sufficient threat factor). 
Is a high level of risk that results from inaction the only risk worth considering? 
No. If the United States launches an airstrike, for example, such an event is likely to result 
in a global nuclear war—an outcome far worse than having an enemy at the door.107 The 
death of millions of innocents is too great a moral cost. To be morally conscionable, a 
                                                 
105 Louis Anthony Cox, Jr. “What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices?,” Risk Analysis 28, no. 2 (2008): 501. 
106 Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,” 
Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (August 2012): 11–16. 
107 If President John F. Kennedy did not have “days in secret to deliberate,” by his own admission, he 
might have opted to command an air strike. Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50.” 
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commander must compare the moral risk of inaction with the moral risk of preemption. 
Hence, contra Walzer, I argue for the Proportionate Strategy Condition. 
Proportionate Strategy Condition: To strike first, a commander must 
justifiably believe that preemption is part of a moral-risk proportionate 
strategy—that the moral risk of preemption is not disproportionate to that 
of non-preemption. 
B. COMMANDER UNCERTAINTY 
A commander cannot know with complete certainty what the enemy will do or what 
action is best.108 In any preemptive strike decision, the total array of possible outcomes 
and relevant factors are unknown, which means a commander’s beliefs per any of the three 
necessary conditions are, to some degree, uncertain.109 Even if a commander’s team of 
analysts and experts are adept at discovering patterns, building models, assessing risks, and 
studying the relationship between variables, it is inevitable that anomalies will emerge. 
Epistemic uncertainty is an inevitable component of life and in war.110  
In spite of epistemic uncertainty, a commander may take a prospective view with 
respect to her decision; her preemptive act is morally permissible only if her justifiable 
beliefs per the three conditions—Credible Threat, Temporal Necessity, and Proportionate 
Strategy—are prospectively true. A prospective view is an attempt to reconcile the 
epistemic gap, based on uncertainty, between what is objectively right and what is 
subjectively apparent. To know what is “actually best” from an objective standpoint is 
impossible, but to prefer what is “apparently best” is too broad to be counted as good 
                                                 
108 Epistemic uncertainty is a type of “friction” (pp. 113–119), an added danger, and a great mental 
strain on all commanders in war. Furthermore, epistemic uncertainty is merely amplified by the “fog of 
war” (p. 193). Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. & trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 
109 Mark F. Cancian, “Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts,” Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, (February 2018). https://www.csis.org/analysis/coping-surprise-great-power-
conflicts.  
110 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World 
Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61–89, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009967. Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–91, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185. Muhammet A. Bas and Robert Schub, “Theoretical and Empirical 
Approaches to Uncertainty and Conflict in International Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Politics, September 26, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.537. 
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normative guidance.111 Instead, a commander can do what is “prospectively best” or 
“probably best” based on the evidence available.112 A variant to the Proportionate Strategy 
Condition is that a commander ought to preempt if and only if it is her prospectively best 
option.113 At first glance, this may not seem a worthwhile improvement, but the subtlety 
lies in the fact that what is prospectively best appeals to a non-subjective epistemic 
standard. In its original formulation, the Proportionate Strategy Condition (in addition to 
the two conditions that substantiate imminence) is qualified by a justifiable belief. A 
justifiable belief also appeals to a non-subjective epistemic standard. What is prospectively 
best or what counts as a justifiable belief implies that a commander’s grip on the truth is 
based on sound evidence, a good-faith assessment of any counter-evidence, and a good-
faith assessment of any counter-interpretations of the evidence. A justifiable belief also 
implies that her belief is, to the maximum extent possible, independent of personal bias 
and non-relevant factors.  
Approaching her decision point for preemption, given that the first two conditions 
are preconditions for the third, I assume that a commander justifiably believes she is in a 
kill or let die situation. This entails that she justifiably believes, or has near certainty, that 
a foe is poised to attack and that unless she strikes first, a friend will be unjustly killed.114 
However, a commander is still faced with an insurmountable moral danger: A prospective 
aggressor may, contrary to the evidence, not actually attack. The probability of non-
aggression might be 1%, 5%, or even more. There is no fixed threshold of probability that 
a commander must assess based on a justifiable belief. To preempt requires moral courage 
insofar as a commander must accept some degree of moral risk.115 If an aggressor will not 
attack, if a prospective aggressor’s actual intent falls short of aggression, then, in an 
objective sense, that enemy is not liable to be killed. Objectively, in a choice between 
                                                 
111 Michael J. Zimmerman, Ignorance and Moral Obligation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 7–8.  
112 Zimmerman, 7–8.  
113 Zimmerman, 92. 
114 By friend, I mean a fellow citizen, soldier, partner, or any person who she has a duty to defend.  
115 How much risk a commander is willing or should be willing to accept will depend on many factors 
that are beyond our scope here.  
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killing someone or allowing someone to die, when both are non-liable, it is worse to kill.116 
However, in spite of this moral danger, a commander may still justifiably preempt from a 
prospective point of view. In a prospective sense, as paradoxical as it may sound, an 
evidence-based moral asymmetry still exists. For a commander who justifiably believes 
that a friend is non-liable and a prospective foe is liable to be harmed, it is prospectively 
worse to allow an unjust harm than to kill.  
C. EXPECTED VALUE AND MORAL RISK 
In a first-strike decision, commanders should consider their course selection in 
terms of two different strategies: the best of all worst-case outcomes (maximin) and 
expected value (EV). Maximin—to choose that which maximizes the minimum or worst-
case outcome—highlights potential risk, whereas EV calculates cold-blooded utility.117 
Commanders should compare strategies because neither a risk-averse strategy (maximin) 
or a utility maximization strategy (EV) is always better than the other. A commander may 
generally prioritize risk aversion over utility maximization, however, he may then find 
himself in a situation where the risk of a negative outcome is so low that utility 
considerations prevail. Likewise, another commander may generally prioritize utility 
maximization but find herself in a situation where the risk of a negative outcome is too 
grave to ignore. I suggest that a cost/benefit comparison of each strategy outcome is best 
to enable commanders to deliberate in terms of both moral utility and moral risk.  
This section builds off of the sinking ship case introduced earlier to illustrate the 
unique advantages gained from a maximin strategy. I assume a general familiarity with 
utility maximization. In this analysis, I will compare two strategies—EV, and maximin—
and look at the same problem using two different value systems: moral and non-moral. In 
                                                 
116 Haque, Law and Morality at War, 10–14, 183; Victor Tadros, “Duty and Liability,” Utilitas; 
Cambridge 24, no. 2 (June 2012): 271–77. 
117 How I apply maximin is distinct from the principle of social justice used by John Rawls. Rawls 
considers maximin as a principle to maximize the welfare of the least well-off members in a society. He 
argues that there are certain things, such as liberty, with which it is irrational to gamble. John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (revised edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 (original 1971). See 
also, Kenneth J. Arrow, “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 70, no. 9 (1973): 245–63. 
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this sinking ship example, the course selection with the greatest EV is not the same as the 
action with the maximin value. What the crew stands to lose in an impersonal moral sense 
is greater than what they stand to gain, which could drive them to select a maximin strategy 
as opposed to an EV strategy. Meanwhile, if we assume the crew works for Company X, 
which is only driven by short-term profit, we can evaluate the crew’s course selection based 
on non-moral considerations. Perhaps, financially, what Company X stands to gain is much 
greater than what they stand to lose, which could drive the crew to select an expected value 
strategy. I isolate non-moral considerations to financial values as a heuristic for national or 
small-unit commanders—financial values are simply easier to quantify than other elements 
of military or grand strategy. At any rate, I aim to show that a commander’s approach to 
preemption will depend on his or her willingness to accept both moral and non-moral risks. 
Ship Sink 3: Suppose that Company X tasks a crew—one captain, and five 
crewmembers—to embark on an Arctic journey. Long after leaving port, 
the crew discovers that their ship is leaking and slowly sinking. Fortunately, 
they turn on an onboard bilge pump and their ship’s buoyancy returns to 
normal, despite the leak. The likelihood that the pump will continue to 
function for the next several weeks until they are within reach of their 
destination is 80%. However, if they do not begin their 48-hour return 
journey in the next hour AND the pump fails, they will be beyond the reach 
of any port and all six members will drown. The likelihood that the pump 
will fail is 20%. Just as in the first two cases, the only way to save the crew 
is to kill the captain.  
1. Moral Lens 
Within this hour, in their last window of opportunity, the crew must decide on a 
course of action: either to press ahead (inaction, in this sense, is a kind of action) or to kill 
the captain in order to save the crew.118 If they press ahead, there is no opportunity for 
recourse. If they kill the captain, there is no reset option either. The crew is factually 
uncertain of what will happen, but they realize that there is a total of four possible outcomes 
(Figure 2). Each course selection presents two possibilities: either the bilge pump fails and 
the ship begins to slowly sink (20%), or the pump does not fail and the ship does not sink 
(80%). Ultimately, I show that it is morally permissible for the crew to kill the captain. 
                                                 
118 When inaction or caution is the result of moral deliberation, and not the result of dilated 




Figure 2.  Four Possible Outcomes 
Is the captain liable to be killed based on his refusal to turn the ship around? By 
refusing to turn the ship around, the captain exposes his crew to the risk of lethal harm. 
Can the imposition of risk, on its own, make someone liable to be killed? Yes, in some 
cases, and perhaps in a matter of degrees.  
Consider a game of Russian Roulette. One round of this game entails that Player 1 
has a partially-loaded gun, aims it at Player 2, and pulls the trigger. Player 1 is about to 
‘play’ one round, but Player 2 wants to quit. Earlier, they were playing with a one-million-
shot revolver, but that incredulous gun broke. Now, they can only play with a five-shot 
revolver. Player 2 thinks that is crazy, but Player 1 is irreconcilable. He is going to pull the 
trigger against Player 2, regardless. In a five-shot revolver, the probability that the bullet is 
in the active cylinder, that a ‘play’ will result in a kill, is 20%. This game has two possible 
futures: in future A, Player 1a kills Player 2a (20%); in future B, Player 1b does not kill 
Player 2b (80%). This game is not unlike the Ship Sink 3 case.  
By playing such a game, Player 1 commits a moral crime of “culpable risk creation” 
regardless of whether the gun fires or dry-fires.119 To pull the trigger is a needless and 
“egregious” risk to Player 2’s life.120 One view is that exposure to an “unwanted risk” is 
                                                 
119 Sanford H. Kadish, “The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,” Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology; Chicago 84, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 681. 
120 Kadish, “The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,” 682. 
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itself a kind of harm.121 As a result of his exposure to an unwanted risk, Player 2b’s 
“baseline welfare” decreases and he thereby suffers a “risk-based harm” that is as real as 
an “outcome harm.”122 If we accept this view, then both Player 1a and Player 1b would 
each be morally responsible for an unjust harm and thus morally liable.  
But there is a difference in the respective harms for which Player 1a and Player 1b 
are each responsible—after all, Player 1a kills and Player 1b does not kill. While the 
uncertainty of the situation, until Player 1 pulls the trigger, makes the future A and B 
outcomes equally unknown, it does not follow that both Player 1a and Player 1b are equally 
liable to be killed or liable to be killed to the same degree. From a prospective or evidence-
relative point of view, the fact that one cannot know with any certainty whether future A 
or future B will actually occur does not alter the fact that, from an objective or fact-relative 
point of view, outcomes matter too. After Player 1 pulls the trigger, there is a moral 
difference. Player 1a’s crime of killing is morally worse than Player 1b’s imposition of 
risk. If a court judge could somehow try both cases, in both future A and B, Player 1b 
would receive less punishment because “different degrees of wrongdoing deserve different 
punishments.”123 Given that Russian Roulette is an evil game of pure chance, however, a 
difference in moral treatment between the two versions of Player 1 might seem unfair. But 
the law does recognize, at least implicitly, that a criminal may benefit from “outcome 
luck”—due to factors over which he has no control.124  
How can a punishment or moral desert consideration relate back to liability?125 
Moral desert is retrospective in that it is tied to a past crime or moral violation. Then again, 
moral liability is prospective insofar as it is tied to a current threat or future unjust harm. 
                                                 
121 Claire Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151, no. 3 (2003): 
966. https://doi.org/10.2307/3312883. 
122 Finkelstein, 966. 
123 Leo Katz, “Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One,” California 
Law Review 88, no. 3 (2000): 794–795; 807.  
124 Katz, 807.  
125 Kimberly Ferzan argues that desert and self-defense reasons can “aggregate” to justify harm (p. 3). 
She stipulates that, as a defense justification, liability is a “form of limited forfeiture or suspension of 
rights.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Defense and Desert: When Reasons Don’t Share,” (July 18, 2017) San 
Diego Law Review, Forthcoming, 7. 
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In a case like Ship Sink 3, although the crew does not have access to retrospective facts, 
they can certainly forecast potential outcomes and reason backwards. If the crew is 
convinced, for instance, that both aggressors and defenders may benefit from outcome luck, 
this can be reflected in their course selection analysis.126 Specifically, they can associate 
different moral values to the life and death of their captain, and to the life and death of 
themselves, that vary as a result of chance, which I will now discuss.  
For illustration, I assume the captain in Ship Sink 3 is morally liable to be killed. 
However, his degree of liability can shift due to factors over which he has no control. The 
captain has no control of whether the ship will sink or not sink. However, I assume that it 
is worse to kill the captain of a non-sinking ship (quadrants B and D) than it is to kill the 
captain of a sinking ship (quadrants A and C). For real-world application, commanders 
need not make analogous assumptions in their own proportionality calculations, nor do 
they need to subscribe to the view that liability can change by Fortune’s wheel.127 The 
important thing is that commanders assess whether the moral risk of preemption is 
disproportionate to the moral risk of inaction.  
Regarding the crew of Ship Sink 3, no matter what they choose, to press ahead or 
to kill the captain, their choice can lead to morally disastrous results. The worst-case 
outcome for each course selection is as follows (see Figure 3). Quadrant A: If the crew 
decides to press ahead and the pump fails, then all six individuals (the crew plus their 
captain) will die. Quadrant D: If the crew decides to kill the captain and the pump does not 
fail, then in a fact-relative sense, killing the captain was an unnecessary wrong.  
Since the morally right decision is not clear, the stakes are high, and the risks are 
significant, the crew should compare the moral utility and moral risk between each possible 
outcome. None of the four possible outcomes are good, but the crew may still rank them 
in terms of moral value. In rank-order, the first-preferred outcome is the one where nobody 
126 The corollary to the idea that an aggressor’s degree of liability is subject to chance is that a
defender’s degree of immunity is also subject to chance. If Player 2 justifiably acts in self-defense, perhaps 
his degree of immunity is contingent on whether Player 1’s gun would have fired.  
127 For instance, instead of appealing only to liability, perhaps one can appeal, at least in part, to a
lesser-evil justification. Saba Bazargan, “Killing Minimally Responsible Threats,” Ethics 125, no. 1 
(October 1, 2014): 114–36, https://doi.org/10.1086/677023. 
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dies—the crew presses ahead and the ship does not sink (quadrant B). The crewmembers, 
who suffer a certain moral anonymity or deprivation through their inaction, are poor sods 
who directly benefit from outcome luck. The second-preferred outcome is where the crew 
kills the captain and the pump fails (quadrant C). The fact that the pump would have failed 
seems to vindicate the crew’s action because otherwise they too would have died. If a 
justifiable preemptive act is morally courageous, worthy of admiration, and if the crew’s 
actions prove to have been fact-relatively necessary, then even more admiration from an 
impartial moral judge would befall them. The third-preferred outcome is where the crew 
kills the captain and the pump does not fail (quadrant D). While the captain’s imposition 
of an unjust risk is condemnable in itself, as discussed, his act is either less condemnable 
if nobody actually dies or more condemnable if everybody dies. I know of no writer who 
argues that moral luck exculpates blame completely. The fourth and least-preferred 
outcome is where the crew presses ahead, the pump fails, the ship sinks, and all six 
individuals die (quadrant A). This, of course, is the most tragic outcome of all.  
Figure 3.  Outcomes by Rank Order 
2. Strategy Comparison
For a one-time decision under uncertain conditions, perhaps a commander should 
select the course of action that will amount to the highest expected moral value—over the 
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long run.128 Seth Lazar holds this view. He thinks the risk of a one-time decision can be 
balanced by selecting the “subjectively permitted” course of action that maximizes 
expected moral utility.129 By his account, subjective moral permissibility may be derived 
from the fact that “the objective right determines the objective ‘good,’ the probability-
weighted expectation of which determines the subjective right.”130 To calculate expected 
utility or EV, a commander must weigh the moral utility of each outcome based on how 
well that outcome accords with an objective moral theory. A deontological objective theory 
can thus create a “deontological moral utility function.”131 In anticipation of 
consequentialist cheers and deontologist groans in response to his proposal—given that a 
deontological utility function might appear to be one step towards capitulation or 
conformity with consequentialism—Lazar notes that a utility function can “accommodate” 
a rights-based moral system insofar as what is morally good will depend on and is preceded 
by what is morally right.132  
The application of a utility-based approach, whether deontological or 
consequentialist, creates a unique set of challenges based on its underlying computational 
assumptions. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern recognized in 1945, utility 
theory assumes commanders are “completely informed about the physical characteristics 
of the situation in which they operate and are able to perform all statistical, mathematical, 
etc., operations which this knowledge makes possible.”133 Furthermore, utility theory 
assumes a commander can array all possible courses of action, anticipate all enemy courses 
                                                 
128 At their decision point, the ship’s crew cannot know with certainty if the captain is liable to lethal 
harm (narrow proportionality) or if his death will result in the greatest moral good (wide proportionality). 
For more on the narrow and wide proportionality distinction, see McMahan, Killing in War, 20–32. 
129 Seth Lazar, “In Dubious Battle: Uncertainty and the Ethics of Killing,” Philosophical Studies, 
March 28, 2017, 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0896-3. 
130 Lazar, 13. 
131 Lazar, 14. Adil Haque defends a hybrid view (deontological targeting). This view combines the 
benefits of a “deontic expectabilist standard” and a liability-focused “reasonable belief threshold.” Haque, 
Law and Morality at War.  
132 Instead of treating each one-time decision in isolation, a moral agent can calculate the subjective 
permissibility of an action as if the same situation were repeated over one-hundred or one-thousand 
iterations. Lazar, “In Dubious Battle,” 13–15. 
133 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), 30.  
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of action, produce “joint probability distributions,” and calculate for each a predictive 
numerical value.134 However, even if a commander had access to a series of cutting-edge, 
machine-learning supercomputers, he could not compute, in any last window of 
opportunity, “the whole panorama of the future.”135 While I see no better alternative to 
compare expected moral values than utility theory, a commander will always be “bounded” 
by time, human experience, individual attention, computational power, and rationality.136  
For Ship Sink 3, to calculate the expected moral value of both inaction and 
preemption, which are both subject to probabilities, I attribute a numerical value to a 
selection of rights-based outcome considerations. Perhaps it is possible to convert non-
moral value considerations into moral ones, but I keep things simple.137 That said, any 
attempt to quantify a moral value, albeit unavoidable, is an error-prone affair. One must 
keep in mind that the specific numbers in Table 1 matter less than the rank-ordered 
qualitative ideas behind them. In this payoff matrix (Figure 4), the numerical values for 
each outcome are less important than the rank-ordered moral preferences detailed in Figure 
3.138 Undoubtedly, no matter how commanders select what they consider to be an 
appropriate payoff matrix, an EV comparison can help frame a moral solution to the 
demands of proportionality.  
In vis-a-vis EV, for a one-time decision under uncertain conditions, perhaps a 
commander should select the course of action that avails the best of all worst-case 
outcomes—as part of a risk-conservative strategy. For example, imagine a highly stylized 
                                                 
134 Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), 13. 
135 Simon, 13. 
136 Simon, 17–27. Lazar addresses similar concerns in his section titled “Who brings a calculator to a 
gunfight?” Lazar, “In Dubious Battle,” 19–21. 
137 I do not attempt to combine all relevant moral and non-moral values, principles, and preferences 
(including military, political, and economic preferences) into a single utility function. Perhaps it is possible 
to convert political or economic considerations into a common currency based on human rights: to connect, 
for instance, the power to pursue political self-determination—which requires a minimum level of non-
moral resources such as money, land, access to trade, and the like—to an economy of moral values. But 
such an effort is beyond this scope.  
138 As Lazar prescribes, “We should take the implied precision of numbers with a pinch of salt.” 
Lazar, 4.  
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“Let’s Make a Deal” or Monty Hall problem.139 A player can either walk away with $400K 
or spin a wheel such that her odds of winning $1million or nothing are 50/50. In this 
example, the EV of walking away is $400K and the EV of spinning is $500K. Since $500K 
is greater, one might argue that the player should spin because, over the long run, that 
action avails the most profit. However, EV calculations do not adequately account for risk. 
The worst-case outcome in a spin is to gain nothing, but the worst-case outcome, the only 
outcome, from walking away is to gain $400K. I imagine most people would then choose 
to walk away. On the other hand, if the difference between spinning and walking away was 
only $1, if a spin entailed a 90% probability of winning $399,999 and a 10% probability 
of winning $1.4 million, then I imagine most people would instead choose to spin.140 
Comparative risk makes a big difference in terms of how we shall prefer one strategy over 
another.  
Since EV and maximin are both rational strategies, a decision maker should 
consider each.141 In the Monty Hall example, who could fault a billionaire who chooses to 
spin because she is willing to accept great risks? Perhaps she often risks hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on matters of chance and is just an incorrigible winner. But then, if 
the risk includes a loss of life or liberty—if the moral stakes are great enough—perhaps 
she should prefer a maximin strategy. Then again, if the likelihood of a worst-case outcome 
is negligible, perhaps not.142 I see no clear reason why a commander should always prefer 
one strategy over another. The moral stakes of war warrant a combination of maximin and 
EV analysis.  
                                                 
139 For more on the relevance between EV and one-time decisions, see Paul K. Moser and D. Hudson 
Mulder, “Probability in Rational Decision-Making,” Philosophical Papers 23, no. 2 (August 1, 1994): 109–
2; and Terence Horgan, “Let’s Make a Deal,” Philosophical Papers 24, no. 3 (November 1, 1995): 209–22.  
140 EV(spin) = $399,999.00 (90%) + $1,400,009.00 (10%) = $500,000.00. Mathematically, the 
number of possibilities to attain an EV of $500K are endless.  
141 I do not assume that EV and maximin are the only available strategies. For example, Laplace, 
maximax, and the coefficient of optimism methods are also available, though not considered here.  
142 One could argue that there should be a threshold between negligible and non-negligible risk. How 
to define such a line, however, runs into the same problem as, say, defining the threshold for 
proportionality. Perhaps it is simply easier to use a negative descriptor such as not disproportional or not 




To compare these two decision-making strategies: in Table 1, I assign a notional 
numerical value to each rights-based moral consideration and list to whom each value 
applies; in Figure 4, I circle the crew action that leads to the greatest EV in green and the 
crew action that minimizes the most risk in blue.143  
Table 1.   Notional Moral Values 
 
Rights-Based Moral Considerations Value To Whom This Applies 
The crew lives after averting an unjust harm (12 pts each) 60 The crew in quadrant C 
The crew and captain live as a result of luck (10 pts each) 60 The crew & captain in B 
The crew commits an objectively unnecessary wrong144 0 The crew in D  
The captain of the sinking ship dies or is killed145 -5 The captain in A & C 
The crew dies as a result of chance (-10 pts each)  -50 The crew in A 
The captain of the non-sinking ship is unnecessarily killed -50 The captain in D 
 
                                                 
143 In Figure 4, the sum in each quadrant matches the moral preferences discussed such that: A < D < 
C < B. In other words, the greater than or less than relationship between each interval-scaled value matches 
the rank-ordered ordinal scale in Figure 3. This assumes that moral relations are transitive, which I do not 
claim. I also do not claim that interpersonal comparisons of utility can be made—these values are meant to 
represent objective moral utilities. By design, if the probability of pump failure was 50%, then the expected 
moral value of each decision would be equal. In other words, the absolute best and the absolute worst-case 
outcomes (A + B) is weighted to match the moral value of the two intermediate outcomes (C + D) such that 
an odds of 50/50 would bear an equal EV of 2.5.  
144 Notwithstanding, the crew’s act, in quadrant D, is justifiable from an evidence-relative point of 
view. 
145 I assume that there is a moral price tag for every strike or kill, even when the target is fully liable. 
Some theorists consider harms to unjust attackers as morally negligible or “wholly discounted,” (see Lazar, 
“Necessity in Self-Defense and War,” 41.), but I disagree. Unjust combatants are often valued members of 
a community. Furthermore, from the other side, one cannot discount psychological harms from the act of 
killing (see Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2009).  
45 
Figure 4.  Decision Strategies Based on Moral Values146 
The expected moral value in pressing ahead is positive 37 whereas to kill the 
captain equates to a moral value of negative 29. From a moral lens, an EV strategy pick is 
to press ahead. However, the best worst-case outcome between the two possible crew 
actions is negative 50, which corresponds to killing the captain. As such, if the crew 
compares the logical EV strategy outcome (the green circle in Figure 4) and the maximin 
strategy outcome (the blue circle), positive 37 versus negative 50, respectively, then they 
would realize that, morally, they have more to lose than to gain in their decision-strategy 
selection: To press ahead entails a disproportionately high-level of moral risk.147 Given 
this disproportionate split in moral risk, the crew should select the action that maximizes 
the minimum moral value—kill the captain.148 
146 To calculate the expected value of an act, multiply the moral utility of each outcome by its
probability of occurrence: EV(press ahead) = (quadrant A)(probability of sink) + (quadrant B)(probability 
of not sink). Thus, EV(press ahead) = -55(.2) + 60(.8) = 37. The worst-case outcome that can result from 
this act, to press ahead, is that everyone dies (quadrant A), which has a moral value of negative 55. 
147 If the probability of sink was 8% or less, then the EV of press ahead would be greater than 50 (i.e.,
the crew would not have more to lose than to gain in their moral decision-strategy selection). 
148 In light of maximin, this conclusion might seem at odds with Lazar’s statement that “an act is
subjectively permissible if its expected moral utility is no lower than any other’s” (p. 13). By that standard, 
to press ahead is subjectively permissible, but does that mean that to kill the captain is not? In his paper, 
Lazar admits that his work “is only a starting point” (p. 22). By shaping decision theory into a useful tool 
for deontologists, Lazar provides a monumental start.  
46 
3. Non-moral Lens
Since non-moral considerations are also relevant to a commander’s decision, I 
explore the crew’s decision based on an EV and maximin comparison using non-moral 
values. To compare these two decision-making strategies: In Table 2, I assign a notional 
numerical value to an arbitrary selection of non-moral financial considerations and list to 
whom, or to which quadrant, each value applies; in Figure 5, I circle the crew action that 
leads to the greatest non-moral EV in green and the crew action that minimizes the most 
financial risk in blue.  
Table 2.  Notional Non-moral Values 
Non-moral Considerations Value ($K) To Whom This Applies 
Commercial goods delivered to their destination 2000 Quadrant B 
Goods recovered but not delivered to their destination 1500 Quadrant D 
Training cost to replace the crew (10K each) -50 Crew in A 
Life Insurance payout for the captain -100 Captain in A, C, D 
Training cost to replace the captain -100 Captain in A, C, D 
Insurance deductible to repair or replace the ship -150 Quadrants A, C 
Life Insurance payout for the crew (50K each) -250 Crew in A 
Figure 5.  Decision Strategies Based on Non-Moral Values 
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The expected non-moral value in pressing ahead is to profit $1.47 million whereas 
to kill the captain equates to a gain of $970 thousand. Since $1.47 million is greater, an EV 
strategy pick is to press ahead. However, the best worst-case outcome between these two 
possible crew actions is negative $350 thousand, which corresponds to killing the captain. 
As such, if the crew compares the logical EV strategy outcome and the maximin strategy 
outcome, a gain of $1.47 million versus a loss of $350 thousand, respectively, they would 
realize that Company X has more to gain than to lose, financially, by pressing ahead. Given 
this split, based only on their fiduciary responsibilities to Company X, the crew should 
press ahead because that action maximizes their expected non-moral utility. 
In sum, commanders should consider the Ship Sink 3 case as an example of how 
they might compare moral risk as part of their Proportionate Strategy analysis. While Ship 
Sink 3 is meant to act as an easy example, it still presents something of a conundrum. As 
presented, if the crew analyzes their situation only in terms of moral values, their results 
would support preemption. If the crew analyzes their situation only in terms of non-moral 
values, their results would support inaction. However, impetus for moral action, 
deliberation on whether preemption is part of a moral-risk proportionate strategy, requires 
that commanders prioritize moral over non-moral value considerations. Thus, based on the 
three conditions—Credible Threat, Temporal Necessity, and Proportionate Strategy—the 
crew in Ship Sink 3 may justifiably kill the captain in preemptive self-defense.  
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VI. CONCLUSION
This thesis explores critical decision-making criteria for preemptive self-defense. 
Its purpose is to seek greater clarity on the role of imminence in cases of preemption. We 
began by first positioning preemption in its rightful place, onto the moral side of war. We 
held that in contrast to prevention, the imminence requirement can make all the moral 
difference. Despite the shadow cast by high-level rhetoric that preceded the 2003 U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, we recognized a collective need to combat a false narrative and to efface 
preemption’s shameful vestiges. Next, we noted an interoperability challenge that exists 
between NATO partners—a divergence in ROEs that stems from a weak concept of 
imminence. This combat-related concern helped to propel us into a crucible of conceptual 
immersion—to steel imminence with elemental ideas found within just war literature: 
liability, necessity, and proportionality.  
I argued that imminence requires two conditions. A commander must justifiably 
believe both that an unjust aggressor is poised to attack (i.e., the Credible Threat 
Condition), and that her capacity to avert an attack is constrained by an imminent decision 
point (i.e., the Temporal Necessity Condition). Equally important, imminence is necessary 
but not sufficient for preemption. To strike first in self-defense, a third condition is 
required: The commander must justifiably believe that preemption is part of a moral-risk 
proportionate strategy (i.e., the Proportionate Strategy Condition). The moral risk of 
preemption cannot be disproportionate to the moral risk of inaction.  
Such is the conceptual role of imminence. Insofar as lethal decisions must be 
grounded in one’s conscience, and honor, this has predominantly been a commander’s 
guide to preemptive self-defense. With an imminent decision looming, a commander can 
satisfy all three conditions as laid out and be justified in striking first. While it is beyond 
anyone’s power to know, in an objective sense, whether those three conditions are true, a 
commander’s fortitude may nevertheless precipitate a just strike.  
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